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In this paper I develop a model of international duopoly, where firms invest in product 
differentiation. I show that firms have an incentive to free-ride on the investment of their rival, 
due to an externality generated by product differentiation. A further effect of product 
differentiation is the market-expansion effect, which induces consumers to increase their 
aggregate spending in the market. Depending on the strength of the two effects, the 
investments are either strategic substitutes or strategic complements. I link this result to 
strategic trade policy and show that the optimal policy depends on the strength of the market-
expansion effect. 
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5.  Conclusion Non-Technical Summary 
This paper reconsiders the debate on strategic trade policy in an environment where firms can 
differentiate the characteristics of their output.  When investing in product differentiation firms face two 
effects. Firstly firms have an incentive to free-ride on the investment of their rival as changing the 
characteristics does mean higher market power for the other firm as well.  Secondly, more differentiated 
product increase the aggregate demand in the industry.  The two effects influence the incentive of the 
firm in opposing directions: due to the free-riding firms invest less, whereas a larger aggregate demand 
increases the return on investment.  In my work I show that the relative strength of the two effects has 
important implications for strategic trade policy.  For example, in a more mature industry the market-
expansion effect is comparatively weak as products are established.  I show that in this case an R&D 
tax is optimal.  If the industry is younger the market-expansion effect is strong and dominates the free-
riding effect.  In this case I show that a subsidy is the optimal R&D strategy.  
 
 1 Introduction
In this paper I consider strategic trade policy in an environment where rms invest
in horizontally dierentiating their products. Due to globalisation domestic rms
face ercer competition on world markets. Firms have a variety of strategies at hand
to cope with the increased pressure: invest in cost-reducing R&D, reduce costs by
oshoring part of their production. A further strategy is that rms could invest
in changing the characteristics of their products to reduce their substitutability.
I rst investigate the incentives for rms to invest in R&D to dierentiate their
products. The analysis reveals that the strategic nature of the investment depends
on a parameter in the model. I further show that this has important implications
for the optimal policy as the latter depends on the parameter as well.
Firms place value in distinguishing their product from the one of their competi-
tor. In a survey of London-based rms being asked to rank competitive strategies,
they on average ranked those strategies associated with dierentiating their product
higher than categories associated with cost reduction (see table 1). Furthermore,
rms choose a portfolio of investment in process and product innovation. Evidence
in Scherer and Ross (1990) suggests that three quarters of the investment expendi-
tures of US based rms go into product innovation. Out of the countries studied,
Japan, where rms invested the lowest share in product innovation, still invested
one fth.1 This evidence strongly indicates that not only is investing in product dif-
ferentiation an important strategy for rms, but their investment is biased towards
dierentiation.
In what way can rms benet from dierentiating their products? Two pos-
sible ways are, rstly, rms increase their market power, and secondly that rms
try to nd new consumers. Consider the computer market and the invention of
the netbook as an example. On the one hand the introduction of the netbook in-

uenced consumers who bought a desktop to additionally buy a netbook which is
transportable. This increases the overall spending on the computer market. On
the other hand, the inventor of the netbook diverts resources from the production
of computers to the production of netbook. Thus, the rm forfeits competing on
desktops in favour of netbook production where the rival is not producing. Sub-
sequently, both rms have larger market power in their respective segments of the
market.
Brander and Spencer (1983) put forward an argument for strategic trade policy
1Product innovation is seen as equivalent to dierentiating the output of the rm.
1Priorities Mean Value
Quality of Product or Service 4.7
Customer Relations 4.6
Reliability of Product or Service 4.5
Established Reputation 4.5
Knowledgeable Sta 4.4
Speed of Delivery 3.9
Unique Product or Service 3.9
Product or Service Range 3.7
Design 3.6
Low Cost Base 3.5
Marketing 3.3
Low Prices 3.2
Priorities range from 1 to 5
Source: London Annual Business Survey 2006; page 79
Table 1: Strategic Priorities of Firms
which suggests that governments are able to support their domestic rm(s) by an-
nouncing a subsidy or tax on the investment in process innovation. By announcing
their support for rms, in the form of a tax or subsidy, the government can in
uence
the outcome of the investment game played by the rms. Choosing the policy to be
optimal maximizes domestic welfare. The argument in Brander and Spencer (1983)
was subsequently debated in the literature considering dierent environments for
rms.2 The underlying question of the debate is whether there is a unique policy
rule. Leahy and Neary (2001) reconsider the arguments put forward and concluded
that a case to case approach would be best given the lack of a unifying policy rule.
In a more recent contribution Leahy and Neary (2009) analyze multilateral subsidy
games in the presence of spillovers. They show that the decision to tax or subsi-
dize R&D depends on the interaction of the friendliness of the investment and the
strategic nature of the investments.3
2For example, Brander and Spencer (1983), Brander and Spencer (1985), Dixit (1984), Bagwell
and Staiger (1994), Brander (1995), Eaton and Grossman (1986), Maggi (1996), Leahy and Neary
(2000) or Haaland and Kind (2008).
3The friendliness is the eect of a rivals strategy on the prots of a rm whereas the strategic
nature (substitutes versus complements) is the eect of a rivals action on the marginal return of
the rm.
2My paper contributes to the literature on strategic trade policy by examining the
case of endogenous product dierentiation. The somewhat surprising result of my
paper is that conditions exists under which an investment tax rather than a subsidy
is optimal. The intuition for the result is that by dierentiating their product rms
are able to reduce the substitutability of the product in the market. The naive
intuition suggests that more market power means higher prots in the international
market.4 The result of an R&D tax comes about by the assumption that changing
the characteristic of its product benets the rm's rival by making the product
of the rival look more unique as well. This assumption introduces a free-riding
eect which the policy makers try to exploit by reducing domestic investment via
a tax. The result of an R&D subsidy is owed to the market-expansion eect. By
changing the characteristic of the product a rm is able to capture new consumers.
This implies an increase in aggregate demand. By subsidizing the domestic rm a
government induces a stronger change in characteristics and thus a stronger increase
in the market.
Furthermore, I will introduce the concept of the market-expansion eect and
show its impact on the optimal policy. This concept suggests that rms might
be able to attract new consumers to the market and as such increase aggregate
demand. However, this market-expansion eect might vary in its strength. Two
dierent optimal policies can be derived from this variation: if the market-expansion
eect is strong, a subsidy is optimal. Whereas if the market-expansion eect is weak
the optimal policy is a tax. The interpretation of this result is that the free-riding
eect is always present, but is dominated by a strong market-expansion eect.
My paper relates to the literature on international trade and product dieren-
tiation as follows. Firstly, the industrial organization literature analyses the topic
of endogenous product dierentiation. Motta and Polo (1998) analyse the case of
endogenous product dierentiation with dierent modes of competition. Lin and
Saggi (2002) study the portfolio choice of rm between process and product innova-
tion if rms sequentially invest in both types of R&D. Rosenkranz (2003) and Weiss
(2003) investigate the case of simultaneous choice. All papers consider Cournot and
Bertrand competition with the exception of Weiss (2003), who develops a robust
model with respect to the form of competition. Secondly, in the international trade
literature product dierentiation has a prominent space with the important example
of Krugman (1980). Bernhofen (2001) develops a model of international competi-
4The standard assumption in those types of model is to say that domestic consumer surplus
does no matter.
3tion with product dierentiation. Braun (2008) considers the portfolio choice of
rms in an international trade context and its impact on the skill premium. I here
built on the above papers by considering the choice of the degree of product dier-
entiation where rms compete internationally. However, I allow for dierences in
the strength of the market-expansion eect and explore the rm's behaviour and its
impact on an R&D policy. Furthermore, my paper diers in particular from Leahy
and Neary (2009) in the way the externality is modelled.
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section I develop a general
model of endogenous product dierentiation. In the third section, I numerically
solve the model with linear demand functions. In the fourth section, I introduce a
government policy and investigate its impact on the investment game.
2 A Model of Product Dierentiation
2.1 The General Model
In this section I focus on the behaviour of the rms and will discuss the R&D policy
in a later section. Consider two countries i = A;B which each hosts one rm. The
two rms compete for a third market, where outputs are horizontally dierentiated.
The rms compete via quantities in the output market and additionally, the rms
are able to invest in dierentiating the product they sell. The game is one of com-
plete but imperfect information. The structure of the game and the prot functions
of each rm are common knowledge. Further, decisions become common knowledge
as soon as they are implemented. At each point in time rms move simultaneously.
The timing of the game is as follows: (1) the rms make an investment to dieren-
tiate their product; (2) the rms play a Cournot quantity game. The whole game
is solved backwards. At each stage of the game, the rms play subgame-perfect
strategies. After the rms have chosen their investments, these are treated as xed
costs. I now characterize the solution for each stage of the game.
2.1.1 The Quantity Game
The demand function each rm faces is denoted by pi = pi(qi;qj;) for i = A;B
where qi is the output of rm i. The usual assumptions on the demand function hold,
namely @pi=@qi < 0 and @2pi=@q2
i  0. The inverse degree of product dierentiation
is denoted by , which is treated as given at this stage. A lower value of  is
associated with a higher degree of product dierentiation. Let the quantity stage
4revenue be denoted by
i = [pi(qi;qj;)   c]qi i = A;B: (1)
Firms are identical with respect to their constant marginal production costs c. The
















@qi < 0; (3)
which ensure that the solution is a maximum.
With respect to the dependency of the demand function on the degree of product
dierentiation I assume the following







Equation (4) implies that a higher degree of product dierentiation (lower )
increases the demand for a given product. In other words it represents a shift in the
demand curve. I will call this the market-expansion eect of product dierentiation.
Equation (5) is the change of slope of a demand curve with a change in  which tilts
the demand curve, which indicates that the demand curve becomes more inelastic.
What is the interpretation of those two derivatives? The rst derivative indicates
that consumers value more dierentiated products and are willing to spend more
on the overall market.5 Going back to the example in the introduction about
the computer industry and the invention of the netbook, the latter increased the
overall spending on the computer market. The second derivative captures the idea
that with a lower degree of substitution rms have more market power. Again, the
inventor of the netbook rm might stop competing on desktops in favour of netbook
production. This gives both rms a larger market power in their respective segments
of the market.
Determining the sign of the output response of a rm to a change in  is an
interesting comparative static at this point. Totally dierentiating the rst order






i )qi + 2@pi=@qi
(6)
5A dierent way to see this is by interpreting the rst line as the change in marginal utility.
5Note that the output response to a change in  is ambiguous and depends on
the sign in the numerator.6 In general, if the market-expansion eect (@pi=@ ) is
stronger than the slope eect ( @2pi=[@qi@]), the output decreases in . Conversely,
if the slope eect is stronger than market-expansion eect, the output increases in
. The latter result stems from an increase in market power: the closer rms get
to becoming monopolies, the lower the amount they produce and the higher the
price they charge. In the case of the strong market-expansion eect, the increased
demand dominates the market power eect and rms increase their output.
2.1.2 The Investment Game
At the investment stage rms implicitly choose the degree of product dierentiation
by choosing their R&D eort. I assume that a direct mapping of the investment
into the degree of product dierentiation exists.7 One desirable feature of the
mapping is that one rm's investment is non-excludable in the sense that if one
rm dierentiates itself it implicitly dierentiates the other rm as well. Investing
in product dierentiation therefore exhibits an externality. I denote the mapping
by  = (xA + xB), where the investments enter additively to accommodate the
non-excludability. At this point it is worth making assumption on the functional
form of the mapping, which become important later in the paper. I assume the
following











Equation (7) states the degree of product dierentiation increases in the invest-
ment. The rst derivative in Equation (8) captures that it is getting increasingly
harder to change the characteristics of the product of a rm as there are for ex-
ample technological boundaries. The second derivative builds on the latter idea,
and describes that change the characteristics of a rms output is getting harder the
more the other rms output is dierentiated. I do allow for a linear mapping where
those eects are not present, which is the case if the derivatives in the second line
hold with equality.
6By assumption for the existence of a solution the denominator must be negative.
7This is a common assumption in the industrial organization literature of endogenous product
dierentiation. See for example Lin and Saggi (2002) or Rosenkranz (2003).
6Let i(q
A;q
B;)  i() = i(xA+xB) represent the reduced form second-stage
prots. The q
i denote the optimal output of the second stage game which itself is
a function of . I rewrite the maximization problem as
maxi = i()   C(xi); (9)
where C(xi) denotes the investment costs. The investment costs are assumed to be
convex with @C=@xi > 0 and @2C=@x2
i  0.8 For a prot maximum to exist, the


















This characterizes the solution to the investment game. The main interest of this
paper is in the strategic nature of the investments. The algebraic denition of the







i = A;B: (12)
The denominator must be negative for a solution to exist.9 The sign of the nomi-
nator is determined by @2i=@2@2=[@xi@xj], where the second derivative in the
expression is positive by assumption. This leaves the rst term to determine the
strategic nature of the investments.
Proposition 1. Given assumption 2, the strategic nature of the investments is
determined by the sign of @2i=@2. The investments are strategic complements if
@2i=@2  0 and strategic substitutes if @2i=@2  0.
This proposition summarizes the result of this section: the strategic nature of
the investments is ambiguous. The idea here is that although a rms prots always
increase in the degree of product dierentiation, it is no clear at which rate the
prot increase. In the case of negative sign the marginal return from investment
decreases whereas in the case of a positive sign marginal prots increase. Again,
the interpretation is the strength of the market-expansion eect. I will provide a
stronger intuition in the next section where I resort to a linear demand schedule to
show in a numerical exercise that with the assumptions made in this section on the
demand curve and the investment mapping, the strategic nature of the investments
depends on the strength of the market-expansion eect.
8Convex investment costs are a standard assumption in the industrial organisation literature.
9Note that the slope of the reaction function is derived by totally dierentiating the rst order
condition. The denominator is then second order condition. The numerator in the present case
can be simplied as the cost function is independent of the rival's investment.
73 Linear Demand
3.1 Demand
In this subsection, I introduce the underlying utility function and the resulting de-
mand functions of the linear model. I do so to provide a stronger intuition of the
demand functions which are non-standard with respect to the market-expansion and
slope eect. The utility function I use below is a weighted average of the formula-
tion by Bowley (1924) and Shubik and Levitan (1980). In the former formulation,
a higher degree of product dierentiation expands the market. In the latter for-
mulation, a higher degree of product dierentiation softens competition while the
aggregate market remains constant. By weighting both approaches I am able to
control for both eects. The utility function takes the form










 bqAqB + m (13)
where  2 ( 1;1] is the degree of product dierentiation. The parameter  2 [0;1]
measures the degree of the market-expansion eect, where the upper boundary of
 corresponds to no market-expansion eect at all. The utility function is quasi-
linear in m which is chosen as the numeraire. Given the quasi-linear nature of the
utility function there are no income eects. Consumers optimize their consumption
of good A and B and spend the rest of their income on the numeraire good. The
utility function exhibits a taste for variety by the consumer, given by the rst two
terms on the right-hand side. The third term is a competition term. The more
dierentiated the products are, the less competition there is amongst the two rms.
The resulting inverse demand function for good i = A;B is
pi = a   bqi   bqj (14)
where   1 + (1   ). If  2 [0;1] the goods are imperfect substitutes. If  is
close to zero, the goods are highly dierentiated and thus the rms are close to
being monopolists. The upper bound,  close to one, implies the goods are closer to
homogeneous goods and thus the rms face ercer competition. If  = 1 the goods
are perfect substitutes. For  < 0 the goods become complements. Furthermore,
note that the sign of the derivatives in Assumption 1 match the ones in the linear
model. In particular, the slope eect is zero if  = 0 and positive otherwise. In
terms of a graphical interpretation of the individual demand curve, if  = 0 then the
rm's demand curve shifts up, whereas  > 0 implies a rotation of the individual
demand curve.
8To provide a better understanding of the market-expansion eect I aggregate
the (direct) demands, which yields













For  = 1, the aggregate demand is independent of the degree of product dierenti-
ation. Further, if  = 1 then the aggregate utility derived from consumption in the
market is constant which implies that the consumer has no aggregate benet from
more product dierentiation. For  2 (0;1), the aggregate demand does depend on
 and is decreasing in it. Hence, with a higher degree of product dierentiation the
aggregate demand for the two goods expands, as the consumer is willing to spend
more on the market.
The Second Stage Output Game
In the second stage of the game, each rm maximizes net prots with respect to the
output, taking the investments in product dierentiation as given. At the unique





i = A;B: (16)
Corollary 1. The optimal output is increasing in the degree of product dierenti-
ation if the market expansion eect is strong (  1=2).
The corollary follows from rearranging the derivative of the optimal output with
respect to . Note that this corollary follows the idea developed in the general
model where I showed that the output increases or decreases depending on whether
the market-expansion eect or the slope eect dominates respectively.
Substituting the optimal outputs (16) into the prot function of rm i, I obtain









i = A;B: (17)
The Investment Game
Having solved for the second stage equilibrium I now consider the actions of the
rms in the rst stage. Firms maximize their investment subject to the investment
mapping. The formal problem is







subject to  = (xA + xB)
9In order to make a statement on the strategic nature of the investment I can appeal
to proposition 1.
Proposition 2. The investments are strategic complements if and only if   1=2.
The investments are strategic substitutes if and only if   1=2.
A proof is relegated to the appendix. The idea of the proof simply is to show
how the prots change with respect to . Before I discuss the intuition I check the
robustness of the proposition by assuming specic functional forms for the mapping
and the cost function. Doing so enables me to numerically simulate the reaction
functions, which helps in providing the intuition for the result.
I assume that the cost function takes the form C(xi) = 
x2
i, which is convex in
the investment. Further, the mapping of the investment into the degree of product
dierentiation is assumed to take the form  = maxf0;1   xA   xBg.10 Below, I
show the existence of the optimal investments in a numerical example.
In general, each rm is exposed to two eects which have an opposing eect on
the investment incentives. The eects are an incentive to free-ride on the rival's
investment and an incentive to increase the size of the market. Due to the spillover
of the investments in product dierentiation each rm has an incentive to free ride
on its rival's investment; if one rm dierentiates itself it implicitly dierentiates
the product of the other rm. Therefore the rival benets from the dierentiation
and could even reduce its own investment in order to maintain the level of product
dierentiation. The market-expansion eect increases the size of the market and
thus makes it viable for the rm to invest more.
In gure 1, I numerically simulate the rst-order conditions to show the eect of
the market-expansion eect on the slope of the reaction function.11 In the gure,
I depict the reaction functions for two dierent values of . In the sequel of the
section I discuss, the three resulting reaction functions and the economic intuition
of them. With a strong market-expansion eect,  < 1
2, the reaction function is up-
wards sloping as depicted in panel 1a.12 Accordingly, the investments are strategic
10A similar mapping is used in Motta and Polo (1998) or Rosenkranz (2003). Furthermore, the
functional form on the mapping satises the restrictions imposed in the general model. However,
the cross derivative of  with respect to the investments is zero. I will show below that a solution
for the investment games exists.
11The assumed values for the parameters are: a = 2, b = 1, c = 1 and 
 = 0:5.
12The solutions of the numerical simulations are stable. Henriques (1990) raises the point that,
depending on the strength of the spillovers, the solution might not be stable due to the wrong
slope of the reaction functions. I checked dierent numerical values specically of  which did not
change the stability of the equilirbium.
10(a) Strategic Complements (b) Strategic Substitutes
Figure 1: First Order Conditions
complements. With a weak market-expansion eect,  > 1
2, the reaction function
is downwards sloping as illustrated in panel 1b. Accordingly, the investments are
strategic substitutes. With strategic substitutes, a higher investment by one rm
decreases the marginal return to investment of the other rm and induces the rival
to adopt a less aggressive strategy. The reason for this result is the externality of
the investment mapping. With a higher investment by one rm the rival experi-
ences the benet of product dierentiation without investing in it. Therefore, the
optimal response of the rival is to reduce the investment.
With strategic complements, a higher investment by one rm increases the
marginal return to investment of the other rm. In the case under consideration,
the market-expansion eect is strong and dominates the free-riding eect. This
leads to a mutual reinforcement of the investments.
To complete the discussion, in the case of  = 1
2, the free-riding incentive and
the market-expansion eect are of equal strength and cancel each other out. Ac-
cordingly, the investment of one rm is independent of the action of the rival and
merely a function of the parameters of the model.
To summarize the ndings of this subsection, I showed that the strategic nature
of the investment depends on the market-expansion eect. Intuitively, this can
be explained as follows. Firms have an incentive to free-ride on the investment
of their rival, due to the externality of product dierentiation. This eect implies
that the investments have the tendency to be strategic substitutes because a higher
investment by one rm reduces the incentive to invest of the rival rm. However, the
market-expansion eect induces consumers to increase their aggregate spending in
11the market. The implication is that rms are able increase the aggregate spending
and share it with the rival. Thus, the market-expansion eect increases the marginal
return to investment for the rival.
Before I investigate the eects of a policy I develop a result needed for the policy
games. A strategy of a rm is called friendly if it increases the prots of the other
rm. In the model, an increase in the investment by the rival always increases the
prot of a rm as a higher degree of product dierentiation always means higher
prots. Formally this is summarized in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. The prots of one rm increase in the investment of the other rm
(@i=@xj  0). Therefore the investments are friendly.
Proof. The derivative in the lemma can be rewritten as @i=@xj = @i=@ 
@=@xj  0, where the second derivative on the right-hand-side is negative by
denition. By deriving @i=@ =  2(1   )     0 concludes the proof.
4 The Policy Game
In this section, I investigate how a policy maker can intervene in the investment
game to increase domestic welfare. In particular, I look at a R&D policy. The
major contribution of this paper is to derive the optimal policy in an environment
of product dierentiation. Therefore I follow the set-up and derivation of the policy
in Brander and Spencer (1983).
In addition to the two stages I introduce a pre-rm stage in which the govern-
ments announce their policy to support the respective domestic rm. The policy
parameter is denoted by i. The policy is assumed to take the form of a subsidy or
a tax of the investment costs of the domestic rm. In the case of i < 0 the rm
would pay a tax, whereas i > 0 corresponds to a subsidy. The policy is paid per
unit of investment. A R&D policy does not directly change the output game; it
indirectly in
uences the output decision by a rm by altering the decision to invest
in product dierentiation. I assume that a policy maker can credibly announce the
policy schedule and therefore rule out any commitment problems on the side of the
government. I assume that the policy maker has complete information of the game.
The order of the stages is as follows. The government moves rst and announces its
policy schedule. In the second stage, the rms choose their investment, given the
government policy. In the third stage, the rms set quantities, given the investments
in product dierentiation. In each stage, the players move simultaneously.
12I now show that the results on the strategic nature hold, even when the a policy
is introduced. For simplicity, I only introduce the policy in the general model, where
the specic model yields the same qualitative results. The prot function of a rm
changes as follows
i(xA;xB) = i()   Ci(xi) + ixi: (18)










+ i = 0: (19)
The eect the policy schedule has on the reaction function is as follows. Depending
on the sign of the policy, the reaction function shifts in or out without changing
the slope of the reaction function. For example, a subsidy shifts the reaction func-
tion outwards, implying a higher investment in product dierentiation. Further,
the reason for the constant slope of the reaction function is that the second-order
condition and the cross derivative of the rm's prots do not change. Therefore,
the results derived in the previous section, especially on the strategic nature of the
investments, do not change with the introduction of a policy.
The next step is to derive the optimal policy. I will distinguish between three
cases: a unilateral policy, both governments are active and a cooperative policy.
Unilateral Policy Intervention
I start o with the simplest case of a unilateral policy in this subsection. To this
end I assume that only country A has an active government such that B = 0.
The policy maker in the active country chooses the policy that maximizes national
welfare. Because rms compete for a third market I can neglect consumer surplus
in the domestic market. Thus welfare is the prot level of the rm less the total
subsidy payments to the rm
WA = A(xA;xB)   AxA; (20)
where the investments are a function of the subsidy, xi = xi(A) for i = 1;2. The







The optimal schedule depends on the slope of the reaction function and the friend-
liness of the investments. The interpretation of the optimal policy is that the policy
maker has to take into account the response of the foreign rms investment to the
policy and the impact of the rivals response on domestic prots.
13Lemma 2. A government has the incentive to set an optimal unilateral policy,
which is a subsidy if the investments are strategic complements and a tax if the
investments are strategic substitutes.
Proof. The sign in (21) is determined by lemma 1 and equation (2).
The intuition for the lemma is as follows. Considering a weak market-expansion
eect the optimal policy is a tax. The intuition is that the investments provide an
incentive to free ride as they have a positive externality on the other rm. Addition-
ally, the reaction functions are downwards sloping. Therefore, if a government can
in
uence its domestic rm to reduce the investment, the investment of the foreign
rm will go up. This in turn implies that the prots of the domestic rm increase
because the investments are friendly. Considering a strong market extension eect
the optimal policy is to subsidize the investments. The intuition is that the eect
of the larger market is stronger than the incentive to free-ride on the other rm's
investment. Thus, if a government subsidizes its own rm the other rm increases
its investment as well leading to a larger market.
A Nash Subsidy Game
In this section I analyze a policy rivalry between the two countries. Both govern-
ments are now able to support their respective rm by announcing a policy schedule
for R&D. Each government maximizes its respective domestic welfare function
Wi = i(xA;xB)   ixi i = A;B: (22)
The timing of the whole game remains unchanged and both governments announce








Note that the structure is the same as for the unilateral subsidy. However, the
values of the right hand side are dierent. The sign of the subsidy is the combined
eect of the impact of the foreign investment on the prots and the slope of the
reaction function.
Proposition 3. The optimal Nash policy is a tax if the market-expansion eect is
weak and a subsidy if the market-expansion eect is strong.
The economic interpretation of the proposition is the same as in the case of the
unilateral policy. In the model the investments are always friendly because of the
14externality of product dierentiation. The strategic nature depends on the extent of
the market-expansion eect: if the market-expansion eect is strong the investments
are strategic complements whereas if the market-expansion eect is dominated by
the free-riding eect the investments are strategic substitutes.
A subsidy is in line with Brander and Spencer (1983). In their model, a policy
maker has an incentive to announce a subsidy to increase the R&D investments of
the home rm. I nd a similar result for a weak market-expansion eect. However,
with a large market-expansion eect I nd that a tax is optimal. This is at odds
with Brander and Spencer (1983). The dierence is explained by the friendliness of
the investments and the ambiguity of the strategic nature of the investments due
to the market-expansion eect. Furthermore, Leahy and Neary (2001) generalize
the conditions under which a subsidy is optimal. They conclude that a subsidy is
a robust rule.13 The results found in this paper show that, in a dierent set up,
this conclusion does not hold due to the ambiguity of the strategic nature of the
investments.
The Cooperative Policy
I now analyze what the optimal policy is if both countries collude. I do so by
comparing the optimal policy derived previously to a cooperative policy. To this
end I assume that both countries coordinate their policy eorts and maximize joint




i = A;B (24)
Proposition 4. The optimal policy under joint welfare maximization is to subsidize
the investments in product dierentiation.
This result is obtained regardless of the strategic nature of the investments.
Intuitively, the joint government take into account the positive externality of the
investment on the each other's prots. By subsidizing the investments each rm
increases not only its own prots but the one of the other rm as well. Accordingly
welfare increases and governments exploit this externality. In Brander and Spencer
(1983) the optimal cooperative policy is a tax. The reason for the dierence is that
the investments are unfriendly in Brander and Spencer (1983) and thus a higher
investment of the foreign rm would reduce domestic prots. In the present case,
investments a friendly and governments take that into account when administering
a cooperative policy.
13With the exception of non-linearities in the demand function.
155 Conclusion
In this paper I introduced a general model in which rms are able to invest in hor-
izontally dierentiating their products. The strategic nature, which is of particular
interest to my paper, depends on whether the market-expansion eect dominates
the free-riding incentive or vice versa. In the former case investments were strategic
complements, in the latter strategic substitutes. I subsequently applied this model
to a framework of strategic trade policy and showed that the optimal policy depends
on the strength of the market-expansion eect.
In markets where investment in product dierentiation is important, this model
allows policy makers to evaluate the eectiveness of their policy. As I argue in the
paper it is crucial to take into account the strength of the market-expansion eect
when devising the investment policy. For example, relatively young industries might
expand more strongly in response to a change in the degree of product dierentiation
compared to more mature industries. Therefore, a dierent policy approach is
needed for the young industry compared to a more mature industry.
In this paper I focused on a third market. For future work it might be of
interest to include domestic consumer welfare. Domestic producers may indeed
benet from more dierentiation as in the case of the market-expansion eect. This
may be of consideration in the policy-making process. Additionally, rms might be
able to choose between investing in product dierentiation and process innovation
as discussed at length in the industrial organization literature. A future area of
consideration could also be exploring the response of a rm's choice of investment
in product dierentiation to globalisation.
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16Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
I start out by computing the second order derivative of the net-prots with respect




2 (1   2)
 
   22 + 22    + 3

( 2   2 + 2   )
4 b
This can be simplied to
@2i
@2 = (1   2)[3 + (1   )(1   2)]
(a   c)2
b
To determine the sign I can neglect the third term in the derivative. The expression
in square brackets is always positive. To see this I rewrite the expression as









where (1 2) 2 [ 1;1]. Even if (1 2) is at is lower bound, the inequality holds.
This leaves the expression (1   2) to determine the sign of the derivative. The
expression is positive if and only if   1=2, which concludes the proposition as
  1=2 corresponds to a strong market expansion eect.
References
Bagwell, K. and R. W. Staiger (1994). The sensitivity of strategic and cor-
rective r&d policy in oligopolistic industries. Journal of International Eco-
nomics 36(1-2), 133{150.
Bernhofen, D. M. (2001). Product dierentiation, competition, and international
trade. Canadian Journal of Economics 34(4), 1010{1023.
Bowley, A. L. (1924). Mathematical Groundwork of Economics. Oxford University
Press.
Brander, J. A. (1995). Strategic trade policy. In G. M. Grossman and K. Rogo
(Eds.), Handbook of International Economics.
Brander, J. A. and B. J. Spencer (1983). International r & d rivalry and industrial
strategy. Review of Economic Studies 50(4), 707{22.
Brander, J. A. and B. J. Spencer (1985). Export subsidies and international
market share rivalry. Journal of International Economics 18(1-2), 83{100.
17Braun, S. (2008). Economic integration, process and product innovation, and
relative skill demand. Review of International Economics 16(5), 864{873.
Dixit, A. (1984). International trade policy for oligopolistic industries. The Eco-
nomic Journal 94(376a), 1{16.
Eaton, J. and G. M. Grossman (1986). Optimal trade and industrial policy under
oligopoly. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 101(2), 383{406.
Haaland, J. I. and H. J. Kind (2008). R&d policies, trade and process innovation.
Journal of International Economics 74(1), 170{187.
Henriques, I. (1990). Cooperative and noncooperative r&d in duopoly with
spillovers: Comment. American Economic Review 80(3), 638{40.
Krugman, P. (1980). Scale economies, product dierentiation, and the pattern of
trade. American Economic Review 70(5), 950{59.
Leahy, D. and J. Neary (2009). Multilateral subsidy games. Economic The-
ory 41(1), 41{66.
Leahy, D. and J. P. Neary (2000). Strategic trade and industrial policy towards
dynamic oligopolies. Economic Journal 110(463), 484{508.
Leahy, D. and J. P. Neary (2001). Robust rules for industrial policy open
economies. Journal of International Trade & Economic Development 10(4),
393{409.
Lin, P. and K. Saggi (2002). Product dierentiation, process r&d, and the nature
of market competition. European Economic Review 46(1), 201{211.
Maggi, G. (1996). Strategic trade policies with endogenous mode of competition.
The American Economic Review 86(1).
Motta, M. and M. Polo (1998). Product dierentiation and endogenous mode of
competition. Working Papers 134, IGIER, Bocconi University.
Rosenkranz, S. (2003). Simultaneous choice of process and product innovation
when consumers have a preference for product variety. Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization 50(2), 183{201.
Scherer, F. and D. Ross (1990). Industrial Market Structure and Economic Per-
formance. Houghton Miin.
Shubik, M. and R. E. Levitan (1980). Market Structure and Behavior. Harvard
University Press.
18Weiss, P. (2003). Adoption of product and process innovations in dierentiated
markets: The impact of competition. Review of Industrial Organization 23,
301{314.
19